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Abstract
We design an experiment to examine behavior and welfare in a multi-level trust game
representing a pass through investment in an intermediated market. In a repeated game, an
investor invests via an intermediary who lends to a borrower. A pre-experiment one-shot version
of the game serves as a baseline and to type each subject. We alter the transparency of
exchanges between non-adjacent parties. We find transparency of the exchanges between the
investor and intermediary does not significantly affect welfare. However, transparency
regarding exchanges between the intermediary and borrower promotes trust on the part of the
investor, increasing welfare. Further, this has asymmetric effects: borrowers and intermediaries
achieve greater welfare benefits than investors. We discuss implications for what specific
aspects of financial market transparency may facilitate more efficiency.
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1. Introduction
Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) investigate trust and reciprocity in a two-player
investment trust game. Since then, the game has been studied extensively. Ostrom and Walker
(2005), among others, review the literature and identify that social distance, communication and
reputation all affect the degree of trust and reciprocity. The primary focus is on one-to-one trust
and reciprocity behavior.
In reality, many situations require multiple levels of trust. For example, when a person
invests in a bond fund, he or she trusts the fund manager not to misrepresent the bonds in the
fund. The fund manager, in turn, must trust the bond issuers. Alternatively, consider
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In the home mortgage market, institutional arrangements
emerged in which mortgages were originated by one firm (e.g., Country Wide), sold to an
investment banker that assembled them into large packages, and issued Mortgage Backed
Securities (a kind of CDO) that were in turn sold to investors. Investors trusted the originators to
perform due diligence in evaluating the risk of borrowers, and security issuers to provide
adequate data trails and loan servicing arrangements. This chain required multiple levels of trust
to justify investment. As the recent financial crisis shows, failures at one level can spread
through a multi-level system. Further, the challenges recovering show that the breakdown of
serial trust relations can have drastic implications.
Financial market crises frequently prompt calls for reform that include greater transparency.
For example, in a letter to the G20 on June 16, 2010, President Obama states: “We should
support efforts to enhance transparency and increase disclosure by our large financial
institutions.” He further asks for: “More transparency and disclosure to promote market integrity
and reduce market manipulation.” (Obama, 2010). Transparency is often one of the goals of
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regulation ranging from current calls for reform to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Securities and
Exchange Act. One of the stated goals of the Securities and Exchange Commission is: “a far
more active, efficient, and transparent capital market that facilitates the capital formation so
important to our nation's economy.”1 Notice that all of these are aimed at the capital markets,
not at retail lending markets. The implicit assumption is that capital market transparency will
improve outcomes. However, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions about the effects of
transparency alone or at what level transparency matters in naturally occurring environments.
A number of laboratory studies have documented that transparency may actually harm
market efficiency, reduce economic welfare and produce non-equilibrium behavior. For
example, Smith (1991) documents that in continuous double auctions under private information
convergence to equilibrium is faster than under complete information. Similarly, Noussair and
Porter (1992) report that English and uniform price sealed bid auctions are more efficient when
there is a lack of common information. Cason and Plott (2005) find that forced information
disclosure about privately negotiated contracts can significantly reduce economic welfare.
Transparency can also distort negotiating processes in bargaining games (Roth, 1987) and have
unintended consequences on individual behavior in contests and tournaments (Sheremeta, 2010;
Mago et al., 2012).
Given the findings of previous literature, it is not clear how transparency is expected to
impact financial markets that require multiple levels of trust. On the one hand, transparency may
encourage trust between the parties. However, transparency may also discourage investments if
investors know that their decisions are being monitored. The problem is even more complicated
because, usually, regulation promoting transparency is tied to other reforms and occurs during a
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http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#corpfin, accessed 10/27/2010.
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time of other changes to the economy (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Act). Therefore, we
design an experiment, using a multi-level trust game, to study transparency in a controlled
investment/trust environment. Furthermore, our experiment allows us to isolate transparency in
what are effectively two levels: the capital market (between the investor and intermediary)
versus the retail lending market (between the intermediary and the borrower). Although we do
not have clear ex-ante predictions on how transparency will impact trust and reciprocity in the
multi-level trust game, we expect for the effect may well be heterogeneous, i.e. transparency
impacts investors, intermediaries and borrowers in different ways.
The conventional two-player trust game is commonly interpreted as a (single level)
investment game. An investor (the first player) invests money with a trustee (the second player)
who employs it productively and chooses how much, if any, to return to the investor. Because
each player is involved in each transaction and, hence, observes the play of all players, the game
is completely transparent. Our game extends this to include a financial intermediary, creating a
three-player trust game by adding a third player (the intermediary). This allows us to control
transparency at different levels by changing whether each player can observe the play of all
others or only observe transactions involving the player with whom he interacts bilaterally.
In our game, the three players move sequentially. The first player (the investor) initiates the
process by sending money (any portion of his endowment) to the second player (the
intermediary) with the amount being tripled. One can interpret the tripled amount as the case
where the intermediary creates value through the intermediation process (e.g., through pooling
investments, diversification and increased liquidity). The intermediary then decides how much
of the tripled amount to loan to the third player (the borrower), with the amount being tripled
again. This can be interpreted as putting the money to productive resource use. The borrower
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chooses how much to return to the intermediary who, in turn, chooses how much to return to the
investor. This effectively creates an intermediated market, generating gains from specialization
and trade from two interactions based on trust and reciprocity.
Our game is repeated, but we use an independent one-shot pre-experiment version to type the
behavior of each subject in his or her role and for comparison with the repeated version. In the
one-shot setting, we find that transparency has no significant effect. However, in the repeated
setting, transparency of exchanges between the intermediary and borrower (the retail market) to
the investor increase efficiency and payoffs to all parties. Transparency of exchanges between
the investor and intermediary (the capital market) to the borrower has no significant effect upon
efficiency (if anything, the effect is negative). Therefore, it appears that transparency regarding
the borrower and intermediary transactions matters most. Transparency regarding the investor
and intermediary transactions does not matter as much. Further, we find that it is the
transparency, and not the specific exchanges, that increase welfare. Last, we find that benefits
are asymmetric. While all parties benefit from the ability of investors to view the
borrower/intermediary transactions, the borrowers and intermediaries benefit relatively more.
Thus, it is the retail borrower who gains when his or her moves are transparent.
Some elements of our three-player trust game can be found in the existing literature. First,
our three-player trust game is related to the three-player centipede game with a binary choice
space (Rapoport et al., 2003; Murphy et al., 2004) and continuous choice space (Sheremeta and
Zhang, 2009). Second, multi-level trust has been studied in the evolutionary literature. For
example, Greiner and Levati (2005) use a variant of a trust game in order to implement a cyclical
network of indirect reciprocity where the first individual may help the second, the second help
the third, and so on until the last, who in turn may help the first. As in a two-player trust game,
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the authors find that pure indirect reciprocity enables mutual trust in the multi-player
environment.2 Finally, the three-player trust game is related to a 3-person ultimatum game by
Buchner et al. (2004). While related to it, none of this research studies a direct, multi-level trust
game corresponding to pass-through securities; nor is transparency varied in such games.

2. Experimental Environment, Design and Procedures
2.1. Three-Player Trust Game
We implement the three-player linear trust game shown in Figure 1. In the first stage, the
investor sends some amount, S1, of his 10 experimental dollar endowment to an intermediary.
The amount sent triples on the way. Then, the intermediary sends some amount, S2, to a
borrower. The amount again triples. The borrower sends back some amount, R3, to the
intermediary. Finally, the intermediary sends back an amount, R2, to the investor. This
effectively creates an intermediated market, generating gains from intermediation (the first
tripled amount) and productive use of resources (the second tripled amount).3

2

There are several other studies in the literature that investigate direct and indirect trust and reciprocity in a twoplayer trust game (Wedekind and Milinski, 2000; Dufwenberg et al., 2001; Guth et al., 2001; Seinen and Schram,
2006). By allowing trustees to reciprocate towards other investors, Dufwenberg et al. (2001) find that indirect
reciprocity induces insignificantly smaller donations than direct reciprocity and that trustees are more rewarding in
the case of indirect reciprocity. Guth et al. (2001) find that indirect reward reduces significantly mutual cooperation
compared to the direct reward. In the same line of research, Seinen and Schram (2006) and Wedekind and Milinski
(2000) provide experimental evidence on indirect reciprocity in a “repeated helping game” developed by Nowak and
Sigmund (1998). In this game, donors decide whether or not to provide costly help to the recipients they are
matched with, based on information about the recipient’s behavior in encounters with third parties.
3
The potential return on investment is 800%, i.e., (10×3×3 – 10)/10. Obviously, such large returns in financial
markets are unusual, but not unknown. The main reason we chose the multiplier of three in both stages of the game
is for each stage to be similar to the original trust game by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). Such a high overall
multiplier should also encourage significant levels of investment and should provide a needed variability in behavior
for statistical analysis of the data.
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2.2. Experimental Design and Procedures
We design four treatments as given in Table 1 to study how the level of transparency affects
trust and reciprocity. In each treatment, the investor is endowed with 10 experimental dollars
and the game proceeds according to the rules described here.
In the baseline treatment No-T (stands for “no transparency”), parties can only observe their
bilateral interactions, i.e., the investor cannot see the interactions between the intermediary and
the borrower, and the borrower cannot see the interactions between the intermediary and the
investor. In the Investor-T treatment, the investor’s decisions are transparent to the borrower
(the intermediary always observes all decisions made by the investor and the borrower). In the
Borrower-T treatment, the borrower’s decisions are transparent to the investor. Finally, in the
Investor-Borrower-T treatment, all parties can see all decisions made by all players.
The experiment was conducted at Chapman University at the Economic Science Institute.
Subjects were recruited from a standard subject pool consisting primarily of undergraduate
students. Subjects interacted with each other anonymously over a local computer network. The
experiment was programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The computers
were placed within individual cubicles in such a way that each subject could only view his or her
own computer screen.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were given the instructions for the one-shot threeplayer trust game. An experimenter read the instructions aloud while each subject followed
along with their own copy of the instructions.4 All subjects were randomly assigned to a specific
role, designated generically as player 1, player 2, or player 3 to avoid (control for) any valueladen terminology. Player 1 was endowed with 10 experimental dollars. In the first stage, player
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The instructions, available in the Appendix, explain the structure of the game in detail.
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1 made a decision on how much to send to player 2 (any integer between 0 and 10) and how
much to keep. Each dollar sent by player 1 was tripled. In the second stage, player 2 made a
decision on how much to send to player 3. The amount sent by player 2 was also tripled. In the
third stage, player 3 made a decision on how much to return to player 2 and how much to keep.
Finally, in the fourth stage, player 2 made a decision on how much to return to player 1 and how
much to keep. All subjects were told that player 1, player 2, and player 3 can send some, all, or
none of the amount available to them.
After all subjects completed the one-shot experiment, an experimenter announced a second
part of the experiment that lasted for 10 periods. No indication of this second part had been
given before subjects participated in the first part of the experiment to avoid any potential supergame strategies. Nor had subjects been told that the experiment would end after the first part. In
the second part of the experiment, all subjects remained in the same role assignments (i.e., player
1, 2, or 3) as in the first part of the experiment. However, they were randomly re-grouped with
other subjects who were in different roles to form a completely new three-player group. Subjects
stayed in their newly formed groups for all 10 periods of the second part of the experiment. It
was common knowledge that the new pairings would last for 10 periods and that the experiment
would end at that time. Each period corresponded to the three-player trust game and it
proceeded in exactly the same way as the first part of the experiment. This procedure allowed
subjects to participate in a single play of the game, without knowledge of a second 10-period
repeat play version of the same stage game, as implemented by Burnham et al. (2000) in their
trust games. Hence, in one sitting, data are obtained from both single play and repeated play
versions of the same game. We use the decisions in the one-shot version to type the behavioral
playing characteristics of every subject for subsequent analysis.
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After completing both parts of the experiment, subjects were paid for the decisions they
made in the one-shot three-player trust game in the first part of the experiment. Also, subjects
were paid for one randomly selected play of the 10 decision periods in the second part of the
experiment. The earnings were paid privately in cash (US dollars) and each experimental
session lasted for about 50 minutes. Experimental dollars where converted to US dollars at a rate
of 2 experimental dollars to one US dollar. The average experimental earnings, including a $7
participation fee, were $23.15, ranging from a low of $8 to a high of $79 (out of a maximum
possible $97). No subject participated more than once, and no subject had prior experience with
a similar experimental environment.

3. Results
3.1. Efficiency and Payoffs in a One-Shot Trust Game
Table 2 reports average amounts sent and/or returned by parties and the efficiency in each
treatment. Efficiency is measured as the sum of all three payoffs in the group divided by the
maximum possible payoff of 90 experimental dollars. Panel A in the top part of Table 2
indicates that treatments have little effect in the one-shot game. Our design includes the one-shot
game for two purposes. First, we wanted to use the decisions in the one-shot version to type the
behavioral playing characteristics of every subject for subsequent analysis. Dickhaut et al.
(2008) show that subjects often try to build a reputation as trusting and trustworthy types in hope
to elicit more reciprocal behavior in subsequent trust game interactions. Therefore, in order to
identify treatment effects in the repeated game setting, it is important to elicit the true type of
each subject from a one-shot game where there is no opportunity for reputation building.
Second, we wanted to investigate whether transparency matters in one-shot interactions.
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In Table 3, we report regression results that examine the effect of transparency upon
efficiency (regression 1) and payoffs (regressions 2-7) in the one-shot game. Payoffs are the
amounts earned by each person after all players have sent and/or returned. In each column we
report the coefficient estimates and robust standard errors. Regressions (2)-(4) and (5)-(7) are
estimated using simultaneous equation estimation procedures to control for endogenous
regressors. The independent dummy-variables Borrower-T and Investor-T represent treatment
effects.5 Examining the data from the one-shot three-player trust game, we find no difference in
efficiency and no differences in payoffs across treatments.
There are also no apparent differences in distributions of individual decisions across
treatments. Table 4 reports the regression results that examine individual player’s behavior in the
one-shot game. We use simultaneous equation estimation procedures to control for endogenous
regressors. In each column we report the coefficient estimates for the investors’ choices (S1),
the intermediaries’ (S2 and R2), and the borrowers’ (R3). There are no significant differences in
aggregate behavior of individual player roles across treatments. This leads to our first result:
Result 1: Transparency has no significant effect on efficiency, payoffs and aggregate
behavior in a one-shot multi-level trust game.
This negative result suggests that, if regulators expect transparency will significantly alter
outcomes in one-shot or infrequent interactions, they may be disappointed in the outcomes.
However, many interactions are repeated and our results differ in repeated games.

5

The Borrower-T dummy-variable takes the value of 1 for treatments Borrower-T and Investor-Borrower-T and 0
otherwise. Similarly, the Investor-T dummy-variable takes the value of 1 for treatments Investor-T and InvestorBorrower-T. The p-values reported in Tables 3-6 are all two-tailed.
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3.2. Efficiency and Payoffs in a Repeated Trust Game
In contrast to the results in the one-shot game, there are substantial differences in behavior
across treatments in the repeated game (Panels B, C and D of Table 2). The difference is
especially pronounced in the last five periods of the experiment (Panel C of Table 2), where
subjects already had some experience interacting with the same partners in the three-payer trust
game.6 Figure 2, displaying the time series of efficiency in the repeated game, clearly points out
that differences in efficiencies across treatments come from the latter periods of the experiment.
Overall, we find that treatments where borrowers’ decisions are transparent (Borrower-T and
Investor-Borrower-T) result in higher amounts sent, amounts returned and efficiencies. Players
in all roles tend to have higher payoffs. We describe each of these findings one by one in a
series of three subsequent results (Results 2 through 4).
Table 5 reports regression results that examine the effect of transparency upon efficiency and
payoffs over time for the repeated game. In each column, we report the coefficient estimates and
robust standard errors for the player’s choices.7 In addition to the Borrower-T and Investor-T
dummy-variables, we include an inverse period variable (1/Period) to control for learning (i.e.,
1/2, 1/3, 1/4, . . . , 1/11).8 Regressions (2)-(4) and (5)-(7) are estimated using simultaneous
equation estimation procedures to control for endogenous regressors. Also, when estimating
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Also, comparing panels A, B and C it is clear that efficiency in every treatment is higher and the standard errors
lower in the one-shot game than in the corresponding measures in the repeated game.
7
The robust specification allows for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White standard errors. Clustering by group or
running panel models with group fixed effects, replicate the treatment effects since each group of subjects only
participates in one treatment. However, we used the information from the one-shot game to control for individual
effects, which serves as a fixed effect control.
8
For a robustness check, we also included the interaction term (Investor-T times Borrower-T). The estimation
results are very similar, with the interaction term being insignificant. Similarly, we included a dummy-variable for
period 10 to control for the end-game effect. As before, the estimation results are very similar (although the
dummy-variable is negative and significant indicating an end-game effect). Finally, deleting the period 10 data in
the estimation procedures leaves the qualitative results unchanged. All alternative estimation results are available
upon request. In the remainder of the paper we report the results of the estimation without the interaction term and
the end-game dummy-variable. Nevertheless, including either one or both of these variables does not change our
main findings qualitatively.
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regressions in Table 5, we use the corresponding variables from the one-shot game to control for
group/individual specific effects (not reported in the table).9 Effectively these serve as fixed
effects.
As shown in regression (1) of Table 5, transparency affects efficiency in the repeated game.
In particular, efficiency increases when the borrower’s decisions are transparent. In contrast,
efficiency does not change (if anything, decreases) when the investor’s decisions are
transparent.10 We have also conducted a robustness check for these results using the Fama and
MacBeth (1973) estimation procedure, and confirmed our findings that, ceteris paribus,
providing transparency regarding the borrower/intermediary transactions to the investor
significantly increases efficiency while providing transparency regarding the
investor/intermediary transactions to the borrower decreases efficiency.11
Result 2. Providing transparency regarding the borrower/intermediary transactions to the
investor significantly increases efficiency, while providing transparency regarding the
investor/intermediary transactions to the borrower has no (if anything, negative) effect on
average efficiency.
This suggests that mandated transparency can have some effects in repeated interactions.
However, the kind of transparency that seems effective is “retail level” transparency. When the
capital market knows about the interactions between the intermediary and borrower, efficiency
improves. Capital market level transparency (when the borrower knows that interactions
between the investor in intermediary), has little effect.
9

In estimation of specification (1) we use the efficiency from the one-shot game and in specifications (2)-(7) we
used the corresponding payoff variable from the one shot game as a fixed effect.
10
A median regression yields very similar results.
11
First, we ran simple OLS regressions period by period across groups. Then, separately for each coefficient, we
conducted a standard t-test using the vector of estimated coefficients from the period by period OLS regressions.
For the details of the estimation procedures see Fama and MacBeth (1973). Estimation results are available from
authors upon request.
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Beyond the overall welfare measure, we examine payoffs of each player in regressions (2)(4) of Table 5. The Borrower-T dummy-variable is positive for all parties, albeit marginally
significant for the borrower. Shown in Panel D of Table 2, payoffs for the investor increase 14
percent on average when the borrower/intermediary transactions are transparent, i.e. (13.3+13.912.3-11.6)/(12.3+11.6). Similarly, payoffs for the intermediary increase 20 percent and payoffs
for the borrower increase 14 percent on average. As a result, everyone benefits from transparent
transactions between the borrower and intermediary. In contrast, transparency regarding the
investor/intermediary transactions does not change payoffs significantly.
Result 3. Providing transparency regarding the borrower/intermediary transactions to the
investor increases payoffs to all players, while providing transparency regarding the investor’s
decisions to the borrower does not change payoffs.
Similar to estimation results for payoffs, regressions (5)-(7) in Table 5 report regression
results for the effect of transparency upon each agent’s proportion of payoffs (individual payoff
as a fraction of the total payoff) over time for the repeated game. The estimation results indicate
that transparency regarding the borrower’s decisions increases the intermediaries’ and
borrowers’ proportions of total payoff (see coefficient for Borrower-T), and it decreases the
investor’s proportion of payoff. Thus, while transparency regarding the borrowers’ decisions
increases payoffs to all parties, the borrowers and intermediaries benefit by relatively more than
the investors (who actually have the increased information sets). As before, no significant effect
comes for the Investor-T dummy-variable.
Result 4. Providing transparency regarding the borrowers’ decisions to investors shifts the
distribution of payoffs towards intermediaries and borrowers, while providing transparency
regarding investors’ decisions to borrowers does not change the distribution of payoffs.
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Interestingly, the intermediaries’ and borrowers’ proportions increase over time, while the
investors’ proportion decreases, indicating significant learning. This suggests that retail level
transparency (when the capital market knows the exchanges between the intermediary and
borrower) can actually benefit borrowers by making more funds available for lending and
shifting overall economic welfare to them at disproportionate rates. We find this particularly
interesting in the context of the recent financial crisis where consumers and businesses alike
complained that they were hurt because lending “dried up.”

3.3. Determinants of Behavior in a Repeated Trust Game
The gains from exchange, and hence payoffs and efficiency, are driven by the (multiplied)
amounts sent, not the amounts returned. So in order to generate economic surplus, transparency
has to affect the amounts sent by the investor and intermediary; while the amounts returned by
the borrower and intermediary distribute the surplus and provide the reciprocity needed to
encourage future efficiency through future amounts sent. To measure these effects, we examine
the individual behavior of the players and the determinants that influence such behavior. Also,
we want to examine whether the decisions in the one-shot game can predict the behavior of
subjects in the repeated game.
Table 6 reports the regression results that examine behavior over time (periods 2-10) in the
ten-period repeated game. In each column we report the coefficient estimates and robust standard
errors for the players’ choices. In addition to the variables Borrower-T, Investor-T and Inverse
Period, we include the independent variable IType, which is the amount sent or returned in the
pre-experiment one-shot game. While the investor and borrower have a singular value for IType,
the intermediary has one representing the amount sent to the borrower (used in regression 2) and
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another representing the amount sent back to the investor (used in regression 4). In this
procedure, we are combining and extending techniques developed in two previous papers.
Rigdon et al. (2007) identified the IType of each subject in an extensive form trust game in the
first period of a twenty period repeated game, and found this variable highly significant in
explaining subsequent behavior in the different treatment conditions they studied. By following
Burnham et al. (2000) in observing decisions in a pre-experiment single play version, followed
by a repeat play version, we are able to measure IType before subjects know they are going to
participate in a repeated version of the same game.12 Thus, we test whether this independent
IType measure persists as a predictive procedure for subsequent subject behavior in a repeated
version of the same stage game.
In addition, we include independent variables representing the observable choices in the
current period: S1, S2, R3, and S1Vis which is S1 when visible to the borrower. Also we include
variables representing the prior period’s observable choices: LagS1, LagS2, LagR3, LagR2, and
LagS1Vis, LagS2Vis, LagR3Vis and LagR2Vis which are last period’s choices when observable
to the appropriate player.
As per the regressions (1)-(4) in Table 6, note the dummy variable Borrower-T is only
significant for the investor’s choice in regression (1), affecting the amount sent; the critical
behavior needed to facilitate efficiency. While Borrower-T itself is not significant directly in the
remaining regressions, it has significant effects through the S1 and, subsequently, S2 variables.
On average, the investor sends about 26 percent more when the investor has full transparency, an
average of $6.8 in the Investor-Borrower-T and Borrower-T treatments versus $5.4 in the No-T
and Investor-T treatments. Interestingly, the prior amounts of the transparent choices, captured
12

Burnham et al. (2000) did not measure IType; their purpose was simply to compare single play with repeat play
using data obtained from subjects in the same session. See Houser’s (2003) examination and discussion of types for
dynamic decision making.
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by LagS2Vis and LagR3Vis, are not significant in predicting how much of the endowment is put
at risk, only the fact the choices were transparent matters. Also the past amounts sent by the
investor, LagS1, and returned directly to the investor, LagR3 (which are both always visible to
the investor), are predictive.
We observe that the IType coefficient is significant in all of these regressions, confirming the
methodological value of our pre-experiment measurement of a person’s characteristic propensity
to be trustful or trustworthy. This is important in separating out a source of variation that enables
better estimation of treatment and other effects.13
Examining the intermediary’s sending choices; the direct treatment effects are insignificant
in regression (2). The treatment effect is captured by the amount sent by the investor, S1. In all
treatments, intermediaries sent on average 1.8 times the amount received from the investor
except in the No-T treatment where the average was 1.9. Amounts sent and received in the prior
period (all visible to the intermediary) also had significant effects. Finally, the intermediary’s
sending type determined in the one-shot game was predictive.
Similar to regression (2), direct treatment effects are not significant in regression (3). The
amount sent by the intermediary (S2) captures all of these effects. The average amount returned
was 1.5 times the amount sent to the intermediary in all treatments, except for the No-T
treatment, where the average was 1.3. As with the investor, transparency changed what
transactions were observable for the borrower across treatments. The additional information
given by having S1 transparent to the borrower was insignificant. For lagged variables, only the
transactions that directly involved the borrower matter (LagS2 and LagR3). Knowing the
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Further, because IType is a constant across all observations from a single player in each regression, it also serves
as an effective player fixed effect.
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transactions between the investor and intermediary (LagS1Vis and LagR2Vis) mattered little. As
in the other cases, the behavior of the borrower in the one-shot game remained predictive.
Finally, we return to the intermediary in regression (4) to examine the amount returned to the
investor. The amount sent by the investor, S1, and the amount returned by the borrower, R3,
increase the amount returned to the investor, whereas the amount sent to the borrower decreased
it. The amount sent by the investor last period, LagS1, and returned by the borrower, LagR3,
also are predictive, as is the amount returned by the intermediary last period, LagR2. Again, the
intermediary IType behavior is significantly affected by her choice in the one-shot game. As
with the intermediary’s sending decision, the dummy-variables Borrower-T and Investor-T do
not load. The treatment effects are captured by S1 and R3 where transparency differs over
treatments. The average amount returned to the investor was 0.55 times the amount returned by
the borrower in the No-T and Borrower-T treatments, increased to 0.57 in the InvestorBorrower-T treatment, but decreased to 0.48 in the Investor-T treatment, where the borrower was
not privy to the amount returned to the investor.
In summary, the results show that:
(1) Players typed as trusting and/or reciprocating in the one-shot setting tend to continue that
behavior in the repeated setting. There is also significant persistence in investor and
borrower behavior across rounds in the repeated setting.
(2) Transparency regarding the borrower/intermediary transactions increases the initial
investments and overall efficiency as a result.
(3) More investment creates more lending and more lending creates more return to the
intermediary and investor.
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(4) History matters in a complex and interesting way. Intermediaries seem to learn through time
while all subjects appear affected by how other subjects treated them in the prior period.
Specifically, learning through time reduces the willingness of intermediaries to make loans,
while good prior returns increases the amounts investors invest.
The history effect creates an interesting, but complex, dynamic relationship. In particular,
the coefficients on LagR3 in regressions (2) and (4) suggest that, if borrowers do not pay back
intermediaries, subsequent loans and returns to investors fall. Then, the coefficient on LagR2 in
regression (1) suggests that investors will invest less in subsequent periods. This dynamic would
drive down efficiency and economic welfare. On the other hand, higher loan repayment rates
would drive the opposite dynamic outcomes. One countervailing force might be increased
transparency, but only of a specific kind. Investors knowing the transactions between the
intermediary and borrower can improve investment levels.

4. Discussion and Extensions
We design an experiment to examine welfare and behavior in a multi-level investment trust
game. In the scenario, an investor invests via an intermediary who lends to a borrower in a
repeated game. We alter the transparency of exchanges between non-adjacent parties. We find
that transparency does not change aggregate behavior or efficiency in a one-shot multi-level trust
game. However, in repeated multi-level trust games, transparency matters. Providing
transparency to the investor (i.e., allowing the investor to see the exchange between the
intermediary and the borrower) increases efficiency and payoffs to all players, while providing
transparency to the borrower (i.e., allowing the borrower to see the exchange between the
investor and intermediary) does not change efficiency and payoffs significantly. Providing
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transparency to the investor also shifts the distribution of payoffs towards intermediaries and
borrowers, while providing transparency to the borrower does not change the distribution of
payoffs significantly.
We introduce and test the ability of a one-shot game to measure the trust characteristics of
subjects and to predict trusting behavior in a subsequent repeated version of the same stage
game. This procedure may have value in other applications not yet explored.
Overall, our findings indicate that, in the multi-level trust game, transparency can matter,
improving outcomes in financial markets and economic welfare. On the other hand, only one
side of transparency matters. For financial markets this implies that not all forms of transparency
are equal in their ability to improve market outcomes. In the analog pass through securities
market (the collateralized, home mortgage debt obligation market we discussed in the
introduction), the ability to verify the credit worthiness of borrowers would seem to be the most
important aspect of transparency. We also document that transparency affects welfare
asymmetrically. When transparency matters, it is borrowers and intermediaries who benefit more
than investors in relative terms. In our game, this arises because investors invest more, making
everyone better off. At the same time, borrowers and intermediaries choose to keep a relatively
larger share of the welfare gains. If the policy goal of the government is to make home
ownership (and borrowing in general) more accessible, then transparency about borrower’s
decisions can facilitate this while shifting economic welfare toward the ultimate borrowers. Of
course, in a naturally occurring market, there would be a tradeoff between transparency at the
retail level and privacy. Further, here, the distribution of surplus depends on the unrestricted
choices of the borrowers and intermediaries about how much to return. The distribution of
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welfare gains in naturally occurring markets may depend on the relative bargaining powers of the
agents involved in the transactions.
There are several obvious extensions to our research. First, the trust relationship may involve
even higher orders and our game would be easy to generalize to three or more levels. We
suspect that in situations beyond two layers of trust transparency would matter most to those who
are at an informational disadvantage (i.e., investors).14 Second, trust may be circular instead of
linear as we have in our game. It would be simple to design a game where either the borrower
gave back money both to the investor and intermediary or, alternatively to the investor with the
investor paying the intermediary (as in Sheremeta and Zhang, 2009). Second, transparency here
is in terms of actions. Transparency with respect to entire strategies may have different effects.
Finally, calls for reform often include reporting standards and oversight bodies. One could easily
add a monitoring agent to replace direct transparency in our setup. One could also report prior
aggregate outcomes (as in the original Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995, paper) or current
aggregate information. Of course, all may interact with transparency and help us inform policy
with respect to transparency, reporting and oversight in financial markets.

14

In multi level trust games, investors trigger multi-party transactions without any knowledge of others' trust or
trustworthiness, while up-stream parties such as intermediaries and borrowers can infer others' trust or
trustworthiness from the amount sent or returned. Thus, investors are at a relative informational disadvantage
without up-stream transparency. Down-stream transparency exacerbates the disadvantage, while up-stream
transparency tempers it. Without it we expect to see investment, the catalyst for economic efficiency, to dry up.
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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Summary of Treatments
Treatment
No-T
Borrower-T
Investor-T
Investor-Borrower-T

Transparency About
Transactions of:
None
Borrower and Intermediary
Investor and Intermediary
All Players

Number
of Subjects
48
48
48
48

Table 2: Average Statistics by Treatment
Treatment

No-T

Borrower-T

Investor-T

Panel A: Amounts Sent and Returned in the One-Shot Game
Investor Amount Sent
7.6
(2.5)
6.9
(2.0)
7.0
(2.4)
Intermediary Amount Sent
16.5
(8.0)
14.1
(8.5)
11.6
(6.8)
Borrower Amount Returned
11.3
(13.5)
11.8 (17.3)
8.1
(9.0)
Intermediary Amount Returned
5.1
(6.5)
5.0
(9.0)
2.8
(4.7)
0.65
(0.22)
0.58 (0.22)
0.52 (0.19)
Efficiency
Panel B: Amounts Sent and Returned in the Repeated Game (Periods 1-5)
Investor Amount Sent
5.8
(4.1)
6.8
(3.4)
6.0
(3.8)
Intermediary Sent
11.0
(11.2)
12.5 (11.7)
9.9
(9.3)
Borrower Amount Returned
15.2
(19.9)
17.8 (21.9)
13.8 (18.1)
Intermediary Amount Returned
8.7
(9.4)
10.0 (10.3)
7.0
(9.1)
0.48
(0.33)
0.54 (0.31)
0.46 (0.27)
Efficiency
Panel C: Amounts Sent and Returned in the Repeated Game (Periods 6-10)
Investor Amount Sent
5.7
(4.4)
7.0
(4.1)
4.3
(4.3)
Intermediary Amount Sent
11.0
(12.0)
11.9 (13.0)
8.5 (11.1)
Borrower Amount Returned
14.4
(22.0)
18.7 (25.7)
13.9 (21.5)
Intermediary Amount Returned
7.3
(8.8)
10.3 (11.1)
6.4
(9.9)
0.48
(0.35)
0.53 (0.35)
0.39 (0.33)
Efficiency
Panel D: Average Payoff by Player Role in the Repeated Game (Periods 1-10)
Investor Payoff
12.3
(6.5)
13.3
(8.6)
11.6 (7.4)
Intermediary Payoff
13.0
(12.3)
16.6 (12.6)
13.4 (11.6)
Borrower Payoff
18.3
(19.7)
18.4 (18.8)
13.6 (14.8)
Standard deviations in parentheses
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InvestorBorrower-T
6.9
12.9
9.6
3.9
0.55

(1.7)
(5.9)
(10.9)
(4.6)
(0.15)

6.6
11.3
16.1
9.9
0.51

(3.2)
(9.7)
(17.9)
(9.1)
(0.27)

6.8
12.6
19.4
11.3
0.54

(3.9)
(11.7)
(22.4)
(11.0)
(0.32)

13.9
15.2
18.0

(8.0)
(8.9)
(15.1)

Table 3: Efficiency, Payoffs and Distribution of Payoffs in the One-Shot Game
Regression

(1)

(2)

Variables
Borrower-T

(3)
Payoff to
Intermediary
-0.250
(2.167)
1.062
(2.167)
13.188***
(1.877)
64
0.004

(4)

(5)

(6)
(7)
Share of Payoff to
Investor Intermediary Borrower
0.020
0.000
-0.020
(0.024)
(0.045)
(0.050)
-0.002
0.062
-0.060
(0.024)
(0.045)
(0.050)
0.137***
0.252***
0.612***
(0.021)
(0.039)
(0.043)
64
64
64
0.011
0.031
0.026

Efficiency Investor
Borrower
-0.023
0.937
-2.562
(0.055)
(1.367)
(4.071)
Investor-T
-0.086
-1.375
-6.562
(0.055)
(1.367)
(4.071)
Constant
0.577*** 7.281***
35.656***
(0.048)
(1.184)
(3.526)
Observations
64
64
64
R-squared
0.041
0.023
0.045
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions (2)-(4) and (5)-(7) are estimated using
simultaneous equation estimation procedures to control for endogenous regressors.

Table 4: Regression of Amounts Sent and Returned in the One-Shot Game
Regression
Variables
Borrower-T

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
S1
S2
R3
R2
-0.406
-0.531
0.969
0.531
(0.536)
(1.807)
(3.169)
(1.565)
Investor-T
-0.344
-3.094*
-2.719
-1.719
(0.536)
(1.807)
(3.169)
(1.565)
Constant
7.484***
15.578***
11.078***
4.766***
(0.464)
(1.565)
(2.744)
(1.356)
Observations
64
64
64
64
R-squared
0.015
0.045
0.013
0.020
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions (1)-(4) are estimated using
simultaneous equation estimation procedures to control for endogenous regressors.

Table 5: Efficiency, Payoffs and Distribution of Payoffs in the Repeated Game
Regression
Variables
Borrower-T

(1)

(2)

(3)
Payoff to
Intermediary
2.723***
(0.901)
-0.395
(0.902)
-0.388
(3.677)
14.423***
(1.216)
640
0.021

(4)

(5)

(6)
(7)
Share of Payoff to
Investor
Intermediary Borrower
-0.093***
0.063***
0.030*
(0.024)
(0.015)
(0.018)
-0.005
0.012
-0.007
(0.024)
(0.015)
(0.018)
-0.501***
0.123*
0.378***
(0.098)
(0.063)
(0.072)
0.573***
0.232***
0.195***
(0.029)
(0.018)
(0.021)
640
640
640
0.060
0.032
0.046

Efficiency
Investor
Borrower
0.086***
1.690***
2.435*
(0.028)
(0.605)
(1.358)
Investor-T
-0.027
-0.040
-1.975
(0.029)
(0.607)
(1.376)
Inverse Period
0.095
-4.342*
12.301**
(0.115)
(2.463)
(5.527)
Constant
0.314*** 12.910***
11.805***
(0.050)
(0.803)
(2.101)
Observations
640
640
640
R-squared
0.023
0.017
0.024
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions (2)-(4) and (5)-(7) are estimated using
simultaneous equation estimation procedures to control for endogenous regressors.
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Table 6: Regression of Amounts Sent and Returned in the Repeated Game
Regression
Variables
Borrower-T
Investor-T
Inverse Period
IType

S1
S2

(1)
(2)
(3)
S1
S2
R3
0.928***
-0.207
0.460
(0.323)
(0.493)
(0.699)
-0.145
-0.108
1.601
(0.245)
(0.493)
(1.186)
2.574
7.129**
7.295
(1.630)
(3.236)
(4.668)
0.124**
0.112***
0.075**
(0.060)
(0.034)
(0.029)
Current Period’s Observable Choices
1.419***
(0.082)
1.331***
(0.053)

R3
S1Vis

(4)
R2
0.363
(0.298)
0.284
(0.294)
3.490*
(1.969)
0.083***
(0.024)
0.826***
(0.061)
-0.327***
(0.036)
0.451***
(0.018)

-0.019
(0.192)

Prior Period’s Observable Choices
0.354***
-0.310**
-0.431***
(0.052)
(0.122)
(0.074)
LagS2
-0.174**
-0.289***
0.181***
(0.069)
(0.082)
(0.042)
LagR3
0.456***
0.393***
-0.272***
(0.045)
(0.051)
(0.030)
LagR2
0.160***
-0.147**
0.589***
(0.023)
(0.073)
(0.044)
LagS1Vis
-0.284
(0.213)
LagS2Vis
-0.025
(0.041)
LagR3Vis
0.004
(0.024)
LagR2Vis
0.107
(0.090)
Constant
0.748
-2.529***
-4.054***
-1.362***
(0.560)
(0.945)
(1.096)
(0.485)
Observations
576
576
576
576
R-squared
0.483
0.750
0.859
0.884
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions (1)-(4) are estimated using
simultaneous equation estimation procedures to control for endogenous regressors.
LagS1
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Figure 1: Three-Player Trust Game Screen Shot from the Experiment

Figure 2: Time Series of Efficiency in the Repeated Game
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Appendiix
INSTRUC
CTIONS (Exam
mple of the No-T
Transparency Treatment)
e
in the
t economics of decision-m
making. Variouss research agenncies have provvided funds forr this
This is an experiment
research. The
T currency ussed in the expeeriment is expeerimental dollarrs, and they wiill be convertedd to U.S. Dollaars at
a rate of _22_ experimentaal dollars to _1_ dollar. At the end of experiiment your earrnings will be paid
p to you in
private andd in cash. It is very
v
importantt that you remaain silent and do not look at other
o
people’s work.
w
If you haave
any questioons, or need asssistance of anyy kind, please raise
r
your handd and an experiimenter will coome to you. If you
y
talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will
w be asked to
t leave and yoou will not be paid.
p
We expecct and appreciaate
your coopeeration.
The 24 parrticipants in tod
day’s experimeent will be randdomly assignedd into 8 three-pplayer groups. In addition to the
t
group assiggnment each participant will also be random
mly assigned too a specific typpe in the group,, designated ass
Player 1, Player
P
2, or Plaayer 3. You andd the other twoo participants inn your group will
w make choicces that will
determine your payoffs. The
T experimennt consists of foour decision staages.
In stage 1, Player 1 receiv
ves $10 and thhen decides how
w many dollarss to send to Plaayer 2. The amount sent by Pllayer
1 is multipplied by 3. In sttage 2, Player 2 decides how many dollars to
t send to Player 3. The amouunt sent by Plaayer 2
is multiplieed by 3. In stag
ge 3, Player 3 decides
d
how many
m
dollars to send back to Player
P
2. Finally, in stage 4, Player
P
2 decides how
h many dolllars to send bacck to Player 1. Not all amounnts are visible to all Players ass shown in the
following diagram:
d

Next we deescribe in detaiils the decisionns made by all players in eachh stage of the experiment.
e
Stage 1: Pllayer 1 receives $10 and thenn decides how many
m
dollars too send to Playeer 2 (any integeer between 0 annd
10). Playerr 1 enters the amount sent to Player
P
2 in thee box labeled “T
The amount seent by Player 1”” below. The
amount sennt by Player 1 is
i multiplied by 3. Any amouunt that is not sent
s is automattically allocatedd to Player 1’s
account.

26

After makiing this decisio
on, Player 1 wiill only learn thhe decision madde Player 2 in stage 4. Howevver, Player 1 will
w
not learn thhe decisions made
m
by Player 2 in stage 2 annd Player 3 in stage
s
3.

Decision Screen
S
for Play
yer 1 in Stage 1
Stage 2: After learning th
he amount sentt by Player 1 inn stage 1, Playeer 2 decides hoow many dollarrs to send to Pllayer 3
(any integeer between 0 an
nd the amount available in Pllayer 2’s accouunt at that time). Player 2 enteers the amountt sent
to Player 3 in the box lab
beled “The amoount sent by Player 2” below.. The amount sent
s by Player 2 is multiplied by 3.
Any amounnt that is not seent is automatically allocatedd to Player 2’s account.
a
Player 2 will
w learn all thee decisions madde by all players in all stages.

Decision Screen
S
for Play
yer 2 in Stage 2

Stage 3: After learning th
he amount sentt by Player 2 inn stage 2, Playeer 3 decides hoow many dollarrs to send backk to
Player 2 (aany integer betw
ween 0 and thee amount availaable in Player 3’s
3 account at that time). Playyer 3 enters thee
amount sennt back to Play
yer 2 in the boxx labeled “The amount sent back by Player 3”
3 below. The amount send back
b
by Player 3 is NOT multiiplied. Any am
mount that is noot sent is autom
matically allocaated to Player 3’s
3 account.
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Before makking this decision, Player 3 will
w only learn the decision made
m
by Player 2 in stage 2. However,
H
Playeer 3
will not leaarn the decision
ns made by Plaayer 1 in stage 1 and Player 2 in stage 4.

Decision Screen
S
for Play
yer 3 in Stage 3

Stage 4: After learning th
he amount sentt back by Playeer 3 in stage 3, Player 2 deciddes how many dollars
d
to sendd back
to Player 1 (any integer between
b
0 and the amount avaailable in Playeer 2’s account at that time). Player
P
2 enters the
amount sennt back to Play
yer 1 in the boxx labeled “The amount sent back by Player 2”
2 below. The amount send back
b
by Player 2 is NOT multiiplied. Any am
mount that is noot sent is autom
matically allocaated to Player 2’s
2 account.

S
for Play
yer 2 in Stage 4
Decision Screen
Finally, at the end of the Stage 4 the tottal earnings aree reported to eaach person. Pleease record the decisions and your
s
under thee appropriate heading.
earnings onn your record sheet

SUMMAR
RY
The compuuter will assign
n you and two other
o
participannts to a three-pplayer group, consisting
c
of Pllayer 1, Player 2,
and Playerr 3. In stage 1, Player
P
1 receivves $10 and theen decides how
w many dollars to send to Playyer 2. The amoount
sent by Plaayer 1 is multip
plied by 3. In stage 2, Player 2 decides how many dollars to
t send to Playyer 3. The amount
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sent by Player 2 is multiplied by 3. In stage 3, Player 3 decides how many dollars to send back to Player 2. Finally,
in stage 4, Player 2 decides how many dollars to send back to Player 1.
After making the first decision, Player 1 will only learn the decision made Player 2 in stage 4. However, Player 1
will not learn the decisions made by Player 2 in stage 2 and Player 3 in stage 3. Player 2 will learn all the decisions
made by all players in all stages. Before making a decision, Player 3 will only learn the decision made by Player 2 in
stage 2. However, Player 3 will not learn the decisions made by Player 1 in stage 1 and Player 2 in stage 4.
At the end of Stage 4 the total earnings are reported to each person. This experiment is now over and your earnings
will be part of the total you will be paid.
EXAMPLE
Consider a hypothetical example:
Stage 1: Player 1 sends $7 to Player 2
Stage 2: Player 2 sends $12 to Player 3
Stage 3: Player 3 sends back $19 to Player 2
Stage 4: Player 2 sends back $16 to Player 1
In stage 1, Player 1 sends $7 to Player 2 and keeps $3 ($10-$7=$3). The amount received by Player 2 is $21
($7×3=$21). At the end of stage 1, Player 2 learns the decision made by Player 1.
In stage 2, Player 2 sends $12 to Player 3 and keeps $9 ($21-$12=$9). The amount received by Player 3 is $36
($12×3=$36). At the end of stage 2, Player 3 learns the decision made by Player 2.
In stage 3, Player 3 sends back $19 to Player 2 and keeps $17 ($36-$19=$17). The amount received by Player 2 is
$19. However, Player 2 also has an additional $9 which was kept in stage 2, for a total of $28 ($19+$9=$28). At the
end of stage 3, Player 2 learns the decision made by Player 3.
In stage 4, Player 2 sends back $16 to Player 1 and keeps $12 ($28-$16=$12). However, Player 1 also has an
additional $3 which was kept in stage 1, for a total of $19 ($16+$3=$19). At the end of stage 4, Player 1 learns the
decision made by Player 2.
As the result, the total earnings for each player are:
Player 1 earns $19
Player 2 earns $12
Player 3 earns $17
QUIZ #1
A hypothetical example:
Stage 1: Player 1 sends $2 to Player 2
Stage 2: Player 2 sends $0 to Player 3
Stage 3: Player 3 sends back $0 to Player 2
Stage 4: Player 2 sends back $0 to Player 1
What are the total earnings for each player?
Player 1 earns ____?
Player 2 earns ____?
Player 3 earns ____?
QUIZ #2
A hypothetical example:
Stage 1: Player 1 sends $9 to Player 2
Stage 2: Player 2 sends $25 to Player 3
Stage 3: Player 3 sends back $50 to Player 2
Stage 4: Player 2 sends back $15 to Player 1
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What are the total earnings for each player?
Player 1 earns ____?
Player 2 earns ____?
Player 3 earns ____?
(The following distributed after subjects played the one-shot game)
INSTRUCTIONS - 10 MORE REPLICATIONS
This experiment consists of 10 decision-making periods. The rules for each period are exactly the same as the rules
for the previous experiment. In all 10 periods of the experiment you will remain the same type of player as in the
previous experiment. However, at the beginning of the first period, you will be randomly rematched with two other
players of the other types to form a new three-player group. You will remain with this new three-player group for all
10 periods of the experiment.
During each period, you and the other two participants in your group will make choices as in the previous
experiment that will determine your payoffs. Please record the decisions and your earnings in each period on your
record sheet under the appropriate heading.
We will randomly choose 1 of the 10 periods for actual payment using a die roll using a ten-sided die with numbers
from 1 to 10. Your final earnings for these experiments consist of: (1) your show up fee, (2) earnings from the first
experiment and (3) you earnings from the randomly selected period in the second experiment. Note that after this
10-period experiment there will be no further experiments and your earnings will be paid to you in private and in
cash.
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